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Abstract 
 
In this paper, a lightweight anomaly detection infrastructure named Anomaly Detection by 
Resource Monitoring is presented for Information Appliances. We call it Ayaka for short. It 
provides a monitoring function for detecting anomalies, especially attacks which are a 
symptom of resource abuse, by using the resource patterns of each process. Ayaka takes a 
completely application black-box approach, based on machine learning methods. It uses the 
clustering method to quantize the resource usage vector data and then learn the normal 
patterns with a hidden Markov Model. In the running phase, Ayaka finds anomalies by 
comparing the application resource usage with the learned model. This reduces the general 
overhead of the analyzer and makes it possible to monitor the process in real-time. The 
evaluation experiment indicates that our prototype system is able to detect anomalies such as 
SQL injection and buffer overrun with a minimum of false positives and small (about 1%) 
system overhead, without previously defined anomaly models. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Current information appliances, such as cell-phones, car navigation systems, home 
appliance servers, and PDAs, currently have greatly extended computing environments to 
connect to the Internet. However, in contrast to the personal computer, information appliances 
still lack the underlying support for accessing an open network. Generally, users of such 
appliances do not have professional skills and knowledge about the threats of an open 
network, and without filtering of the routers in their gateways, these systems are an easy 
target for attacks. For example, in 2004 a hard disk recorder that was connected to the Internet 
without any safeguards was attacked and misused by hackers for massive spamming around 
the world [19].  
To detect these problems before the damage expands, detection systems are configured 
with a number of signatures that support the detection of attacks. Numerous approaches have 
been presented in this area. Surveys of implemented intrusion detection systems, many of 
which are already in operation, can be found in several practical systems such as Solaris [29], 
Windows [1], and Linux [23]. In the research area, several effective techniques for detecting 
intrusions have been developed. There are statistical, rule-based approaches [13]; Neural 
Networks [5]; and Generic Algorithms [24]. However, most research assumes mission critical 
servers and personal computers. The requirements for information appliances are rather 
different, from the point of limited resources, from those of information appliances. Therefore, International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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we need to consider small overhead, from the point of view of both time and space. Second, 
there is a need to support diverse applications that are implemented with a variety of 
programming languages and different kinds of hardware. Mission critical servers do not care 
about such diversities, since most servers run similar applications and hardware [2, 9, 8]. 
Third, we need to consider a method for unknown anomaly detection in online systems. In 
information appliances, we need to assume a variety of architectures and programming 
languages. In that situation, not only intrusion detection, but also attacks or misuse, must be 
pre-supposed. The general meaning of anomaly detection is important for this area. For 
detecting an unknown anomaly, real-time detection is also important. Non real-time static 
analysis or debugging should not be expected for information appliances as a background 
service, since their resources are limited. Static analysis may consume a considerable amount 
of CPU time, expensive detection algorithms should be delegated to faster servers in wide 
area networks.  
In this paper, we focus on a lightweight online anomaly detection system that is used for 
information appliances. We propose Ayaka, a new system that monitors processes for 
resource usage and detects anomalies without special knowledge of the underlying system. 
The contribution of this paper is to present a method that uses resource usage (CPU, memory, 
and network resources) of specific processes with an adaptable sampling period, and models 
the normal behavior of the process with a learning method to detect unknown anomalies 
online. This method can generally be applied to embedded systems because there are no 
dependencies on programming languages, platform, or architecture. The nature of this 
approach should bring great benefits for developing new embedded products without the 
modification of applications and tuning anomaly models that depend on the platforms. 
Moreover, our approach is blessed with low overhead. To achieve this, we use the clustering 
method for analyzing the behavior of processes and storing just the precision rate of models. 
This can effectively reduce the overhead at runtime detection, since it just compares the rate 
of the models via online analysis without loss of effectiveness and thus keeps a precise 
detecting rate. We will show the effectiveness of this approach in our evaluation.  
The remainder of this paper describes our approach to automating problem detection for 
processes by analyzing resource usage. Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 describes 
the approach and algorithm of our methodology. Section 4 shows the implementation of the 
system. Section 5 describes our experimental validation, Section 6 presets further discussion 
of important issues for our approach, and finally, we conclude our paper in Section 7. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
In previous work, Koral describes the objective of anomaly detection. He said it is to 
establish usage patterns within user audit trails over a duration of time, and use these usage 
patterns as profiles of ”normal” system activity[18]. The objective of anomaly detection is not 
different these days, but varieties of approaches are available to analyze data for finding 
anomalies. Stefan [27] classified anomaly detection into two types. One is programmed and 
the other is self-learning. The programmed (signature) approach requires someone to detect 
certain anomalous events, and self-learning systems learn by example what constitutes 
normal for the installation. Programmed (signature) data bases are all of the type that makes 
signature decisions on anomaly data. One could detect anomalies from signature data. The 
common research paradigm in the programmed and signature data base approach is the expert 
system which codes knowledge about attacks as if-then implication rules or descriptive 
statistics. It builds a profile of normal statistical behavior by various parameters of the system, 
and collects descriptive statistics on a number of those parameters. The known statistical International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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profile-based Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) is presented in [3]. IDES processes 
each new audit record as it enters the system, and verifies it against the known profile for both 
the subject, and the group of the subject, should it belong to one. IDES also verifies each 
session against known profiles when the session is completed. Ilgun [17] uses state transition 
to model and detect abnormal transitions from the audit trail file. Kumar [21, 26] employs 
colored Petri-nets for signature based intrusion detection. These approaches gain the merit of 
modeling the pattern of the anomaly. Several projects on security [15, 13] also take these 
signature-based approaches. In these signature approaches, there are several limitations. First, 
finding sporadic user environments and establishing profiles of normal user behavior would 
be difficult [18]. This leads to a potentially large number of false positives. Second, it is 
difficult to efficiently specify an order in which to match facts within the natural framework 
of expert system shells. Third, including software engineering concerns with the maintenance 
of the knowledge base and the quality of the rules points out they can only be as good as the 
human devising them [21]. Fourth, the signature based approach provides high precision for 
the detection rate. However, these approaches tend to increase the overhead to take more 
detailed logs of the audit trails.  
Self-learning is the other kind of approach for anomaly detection. It focus on a model that 
builds a normal model of audit data (or data containing no intrusions) and detects intrusions 
based on detecting deviations from the normal model[12]. This approach finds unknown 
anomalies. Some of the earliest work on self-learning is commonly considered to be those 
reported by Anderson [4] and Denning [6]. They provide a detection system that studies 
historic audit data to produce rules describing “normal” behavior. The rules are fed to an 
expert system that evaluates recent audit data for violations of the rules, and alerts the system 
when the rules indicate anomalous behavior. In terms of those rules, this method identifies 
computer transactions that are at variance with historically established usage patterns. The 
authors consider a figure of around 500-1,000 audit. These descriptive statistic approaches are 
also taken in IDES projects [3], and EMERALD [25]. Considering time series data, 
Hyperview [14] provides the untested approach of mapping the time series to the inputs of a 
neural network. At the time, the usual approach was to map inputs to a window of time series 
data, shifting the window by one between evaluations of the network.  
System call traces for a self-learning approach are a common type of audit data collected 
for performing IDS (Intrusion Detection System) processes. A system call trace is the ordered 
sequence of system calls that a process performs during its execution. Steven [16] presents an 
approach to collect a sequence of system calls that can be the discriminator between normal 
and abnormal operating characteristics of several common UNIX programs by using the 
Hamming distance. The precision of the detection rate of Steven’s approach was relatively 
lower than the approaches presented by Keith [20], Eskin [12], and Warrender [30]. Keith 
[20] suggests function call analysis include the system calls in order not only to find 
anomalies, but also for use in forensic analysis. The function calls they capture are the 
significant events that occur in both user and kernel space. However, most of these system 
call/function call approaches are mainly offline since they focus on the efficiency and 
accuracy of the analysis, not on the computing efficiency. Moreover, the models should be 
different from the base operating system. This point is the difference between these 
approaches and our concerns. The performance of these self-learning models depends greatly 
on the robustness of the modeling method and the quantity and quality of the available 
training data. From this point, Eskin [11] presents robust methods for choosing the sliding 
window size and applying them to modeling system call traces. The sparse markov 
transducers (SMTs) algorithm can reduce the time of calculation [12]. The results show that 
method suitable if they tune it, so that the false positives decrease relatively. However, the International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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nature of the system call requires the availability of the sequence of logs that duplicate the 
function calls. It would be difficult to hide the system from the attacker. 
 
3. Model Construction Infrastructure 
 
3.1. Design Objectives 
 
We focus on the security issue in information appliances. To satisfy the requirements of 
these appliances, we will provide a lightweight anomaly detection system using a self-
learning approach. To impose various requirements to make the system broadly applicable to 
information appliances applications, we draw on four main principles. The first is to detect 
unknown anomalies. To achieve the purpose, we use a machine learning technique to learn 
the normal behavior of the process. That makes it to possible to find the anomaly state as an 
inverse of the normal state, without specific knowledge of either state. The second is an 
application black-box approach. We model process behavior using state transactions for 
resource consumption and treat the application as a black-box. This approach can be generally 
applied to embedded system applications because it has no dependencies on programming 
languages and platforms. It brings development benefits for system vendors who develop new 
products with minimum time. The third is real-time detection. Our system provides an online 
processing mechanism. By using the self-learning method, it compares the learned model and 
the processing data profiled, and takes action accordingly that provides functions to report the 
result to the next higher node, or stop the process to avoid abuse of other resources. 
Steven [16] provides a system that finds anomalies and then follows safety procedures 
afterwards, our system, on the other hand, can automatically prevent extending the problem. 
The last principle is low overhead. To achieve real-time detection, we use a precision rate for 
deciding the anomalies that is calculated in the learning phase. This makes it possible to 
provide lightweight anomaly detection in practical use. We explain the details of all of this in 
the following section. 
 
3.2. Choosing Applicable Methods 
 
3.2.1. Requirements and Methodology 
 
The objective of Ayaka is to find anomalies, and therefore it provides functions and 
algorithms to do this accurately. We focus on the anomaly state transition of process resource 
usage that relates to non-deterministic faults and system abuse, such as DoS, fork attacks, and 
infinite loops that also abuse the resources. These types of anomalies have in common that 
they abuse the resources with some specific patterns and risk occupying system resources 
until the system shuts down. To present a solution for this problem, we adopted three 
approaches to develop our methodology. 
 
  Modeling the Normal Behavior of a Process: The first is modeling the normal behavior 
of an application to find the unknown anomaly. There is lots of research presented in 
related work as self-learning. We follow the basic definition, collect normal patterns, and 
define the model based on the patterns heuristically. At runtime, we use the models to 
compare the input stream with previously defined ones. In fact, there is no good solution 
for creating precise models that consider the runtime environment and find unknown 
anomalies with general versatility. We assume that a normal state of an application can be 
observed by the standard behavior of that application. The standard behavior is defined as International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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some state in which there are no significant errors, or attacks, or resource abuses that come 
under observation. 
  Using Resource Usage of a Process: As the second approach, we use resource 
information of applications. Resource usage is language-, operating system- and 
architecture- independent. If there are problems with applications, resource usage is surely   
affected. In many cases, the CPU is used for finding resource abuses in an application, but 
this is not enough to build a complex model of problems. To express the complex patterns 
of resource problems accurately, we use three resource parameters, CPU, memory, and 
network usage, to express a complex model of application behavior. This makes it possible 
to classify cases such that if an application’s CPU usage is 10%, but at the same time if the 
network resource usage is 0% or 90%, the models are different. Moreover, resource usage 
data makes possible to be independent from the operating system which system call 
models generally depend on. 
  Model Learning: As the third approach, we use the machine learning technique to study 
the normal pattern according to domain specific information before the system works 
under normal operation. It is still difficult to create an exact normal pattern of an 
application considering the differences in its runtime environment. If there is a system that 
under normal operation uses 50% of its CPU resource, the anomaly might be defined as 
that state where 90% of the system resources are used up. But, if there is a system that 
uses almost 99% of its resources in normal situations, its resource usage pattern will be 
different and requires a high threshold to be judged as the anomaly. The essential problem 
is that the resource limitation totally depends on the hardware configuration of the system. 
Therefore, we consider ways of learning domain-specific patterns. This makes it possible 
to adapt to a new environment without domain specific knowledge of the system. 
 
3.2.2. Hidden Markov Model 
 
To satisfy those requirements, we consider a way of analyzing the essential features of the 
resource usage model of a process. Resource usage changes continually as time goes on. We 
analyze this by using time series analysis methods. There are several methods used to analyze 
time series data. For example, Fourier analysis is one of the most famous methods used to 
analyze time series data. However, it needs the strong assumption that steady-state 
performance of the data is known, and needs to be applied to a function with an infinite 
period. Our resource consumption data is not usually the steady-state type. To develop 
effective models of applications, we need a method that can model the transitional state of 
resource usage. Moreover, to satisfy the last requirement, that we need to build a domain 
specific model of the application, we assume machine learning is needed.  
For these reasons, we apply the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). It is a powerful modeling 
technique that represents the discrete states of resource consumption of processes. This also 
provides the procedures for machine learning methodology. The main idea of the HMM is 
that an observation sequence generated by a system is represented as a finite number of states 
[7]. For each step, it makes a transition from its current state to another state, according to a 
specific probability distribution inferred from the observation symbol. It is defined by the 
number of states. HMM generates different models which do not have different transitional 
states. We use the HMM to analyze the resource data and create models of the normal state of 
the application with machine learning methodology. 
 
3.2.2. Model Construction Procedure 
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The procedure, starting from the resource data to developing the HMM model, is classified 
into the following steps. The first step is the preparation for the analysis. We cannot use the 
sampling data that a system generates directly as parameters for HMM, because there is too 
much data. Therefore, we convert the sampling data by calculating resource vectors. Then, we 
classify them into groups that have similarities by the clustering method. The second step is 
analysis of the data to create normal models of applications with HMM. To calculate the 
probability of the models, we use several techniques to learn the precise models of the 
application. We call this step model learning. The system stores the normal pattern. The third 
step is online analysis. According to the sampling data of the application, Ayaka evaluates 
whether the current state is normal or not by comparing the precision of the normal models. 
 
3.2.4. Data Set 
 
First of all, resource consumption data from processes of an application such as CPU usage, 
memory usage, and network usage, is collected from the system. We define the following 
formula to calculate their usage. We assume a sampling period T is defined as a period. CPU 
resource usage Ucpu is defined as the rate of computation time C of a process within the period 
T. It is defined by the following formula. 
T C Ucpu /                                          (1) 
Actually, a process is both stopping and running during this period T. For example, we 
assume the start time of a process is Cs0 and the finish time of the process is defined as Ce0. If 
the process uses CPU time again, we describe the next incidence as Cs1 and Ce1. Then the 
general formula is defined as follows (2). 
                
T C C U i si ei cpu    / ) (                                     (2) 
Memory usage is different from CPU usage at the point that it is calculated by the quantity. 
Memory usage Umem is defined by the rate of the quantities m consumed by each process 
within all the memory M that is installed in the system. As we explained in CPU usage, a 
process allocates and frees a memory block during a period. We assume a chunk of memory 
m at a time t is defined by m0 and t0, respectively. After a while, the quantity is changed to m1 
at time t1, then changed to m2 at time t2. It is represented by the following formula (3). 
                M T m U n
i i i i mem t t     

  1
0 1 / ) (                     (3) 
Network usage Unet is calculated by the maximum data transfer speed v and the transferred 
data of the process d within the period T (4). The maximum quantity of data transfer is 
always changing in networks. If we define just the rate for Unet by the quantity of data transfer 
and the maximum quantity of data transfer within T, it will be wrong. To specify the correct 
rate of the traffic, we use v as a constant (1,000,000 bytes) and express the average rate of the 
traffic (MB/s) as the rate of the network.  
        T v d Unet   /                                                                              (4) 
Before collecting data, we set the sampling period T to calculate resources by formulas (2) 
and (3). The collected data is defined as Ucpu,Umem,Unet. A set of these data is defined as a 
vector veci. The ith resource vector is represented as veci = (Ui,,cpu,Ui,mem,Ui,net). We make 
them a set and define u to represent this as a vector u = {Ucpu,Umem,Unet}. The ith collected 
data set is defined as ui, then the set of resources is defined as ui = {Ui,cpu,Ui,mem,Ui,net}. For 
example, there are two sampling data items, the ith and i + 1, the resources are described as 
Ui  and Ui+1. The ith vector is calculated as follows. 
2 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 1 net net mem mem cpu cpu U U U U U U vec       . The nth set of International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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vectors is defined as vecn. We decide the changing point of the data is the delimiter of the 
data. The changing point of the boundary is      u ui 1 . Using this boundary, we 
partition the data and apply the k-mean method. We use  = 0.1 as the boundary in this paper. 
The advantage of computing distance between the vectors rather than the raw traces is that the 
tendencies of resource consumption are less sensitive to insignificant variations in application 
behavior. However, once an anomaly occurs, the behavior of an application changes 
substantially. 
3.2.5. Clustering with the k-mean method 
     
     Clustering is a method used to partition a data set into subsets (clusters) so that the data in 
each subset share a common trait. We use the proximity of similarity according to a distance 
measure of resource vectors. A vector consists of CPU, memory, and network resource usage 
 
Table 1.  Number of Clusters (k) and Evaluation 
 
k  False negative  False positive 
6 0  2 
14 0  4 
20 0  0 
False negative (Fn): The anomaly is not detected. 
False positive (Fp): The anomaly is reported but not present. 
 
at a certain sampling period. In order to cluster and abstract this data, the k-mean algorithm 
[22] is applied with k being the number of clusters. Compared to an algorithm that creates a 
hierarchical tree, this one reduces the amount of calculations.  
The first step of the k-mean algorithm is to choose the number of clusters. The appropriate 
k depends on the domain. k must be determined empirically. We decided to conduct tests to 
find a suitable k for satisfying our results. We first evaluated the initial parameters {6, 14, 20} 
(shown in Table 1) as a candidate for k. The evaluation method is described in detail in 
Section 5.3. According to the SQL injection detection results, shown in Table 1, we found k = 
20 clearly identifies the differences of anomalies more precisely than the other numbers.  
k-mean assigns each point to the cluster whose center (called the centroid) is the nearest. 
The center is the average of all the points in the cluster, which means the centroid is equal to 
the arithmetic mean for all dimensions. To classify the data for a cluster, we set the unique 
number of clusters to k and then set a parameter for the cluster as an initial centroid parameter. 
We define the jth cluster’s centroid as cj . At this time, the cluster that has the centroid cj is 
defined as Cj  . The first step of the classification of the vector data ui  is to select the 
appropriate jth cluster Cj that has the smallest distance to the point of the similarities. The 
nearest cluster is defined as the minimum distance between ui and centroid cj (min (|cj - uj|)). 
If all of the calculations of ui are finished, then, as a next step, we recomputed each centroid cj 
as j C c u u j / ) (   
to calculate the new centroid.  
These steps are repeated until the convergence criterion is met. At the end, each vector ui 
exports the cluster number which classifies itself. For example, if the vector u1 is classified to 
one of the 20 clusters C3, and if u2 is classified to C1 and u3 to C2, we will see the result that 
the unit of emission symbols of the vectors u1, u2 and u3 are classified into C3, C1,C2.  
 
3.3. Model Learning with HMM 
3.3.1. Topology International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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There are two competing HMM instances we might return to. These are the ergodic and the 
left-right models. In the ergodic HMM, every state of the model can be reached from every 
other state. Table 2 shows that the ergodic 8 is the minimum number of states and most 
accurate for determining false negatives and positive numbers in evaluation. In the end, we 
chose our model to be an ergodic HMM with 8 states, for convenience. 
 
3.3.2. Estimating Parameters 
 
In HMM, transitions among the states are governed by a set of probabilities called 
transition probabilities. In a particular state, an outcome can be produced. It is only the 
outcome, not the state that is visible to an external observer, as states are hidden to the 
outside. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the maximum likelihood.   The Baum-Welch 
algorithm [7] estimates parameters of a given HMM and produces a new model which has a 
higher probability of generating the given observation sequence. This procedure is continued 
until no more significant improvement can be obtained. The algorithm is a general way of 
calculating the maximum likelihood with guaranteed convergence. In our system, an HMM 
 
Table 2. Precision compared with the Number of States and Topologies 
 
Topology  Num of States  False negative  False positive 
left-to-right 6  1  1 
 8  3  0 
 10  3  0 
ergodic 6  0  0 
 8  0  0 
 10  0  0 
 
model is initialized for every incoming vector and then optimized by the Baum-Welch 
algorithm. The Backward-forward algorithm is a method for calculating this efficiently. We 
use it for efficiency of the calculation. First of all, the Baum-Welch algorithm uses the 
forward-backward algorithm to calculate the certain probability of the ith state of time t with 
time series (forward) and reverse (backward). The forward probability of  ) (t fi is calculated 
by formula (5), and the backward probability is calculated by formula (6). In this model, the 
transitional probability of the state  j i   is defined as aij, and the probability of the emission k 
at the time of state i is defined as bi(k). The emission of time t is defined as V(t). 
                                            
j
i ji j i t V b a t f t f )) ( ( ) 1 ( ) (                                            (5) 
                       
j
j i ij i t g t V b a t g ) 1 ( )) 1 ( ( ) (                                          (6) 
The probability of  ij  which proceeds the transition j i   at time of t  is calculated by 
formula (7) at the emission sequence T
t t V 0 ) (  . In a similar way, the probability of  i  is 
calculated by formula (8) at the probability of state i at the time of t.  SF shows the last state of 
the set under the Markov Model.  
                                           
    

F S k k
i j ij i
j
T f
t g t V b a t f
i
) (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( ) (
                               (7) 
                                                          
j
ij i t t ) ( ) (                                                        (8) International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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By these calculations, the estimate  ij a ˆ  of the probability of state transition  ij a is calculated by 
formula (9). The estimation of the probability value  ) ( ˆ k bj that the emission symbol is vk, 
when the state is sj is calculated by formula (10). 
                                                     





  1
0
1
0
) (
) (
ˆ
T
t i
T
t i
ij
t
t
a
j


                                                    (9) 
                                                   



   T
t
vk t V t j
j
t
t
b
j 0
) (
) (
) ( ˆ


                                              (10) 
bi(k) is the probability that the emission is k. {V(t)} is the emission at time t. When the 
emission is  T
t t V 0 ) (  , the probability of the data and model (precision) p is represented by the 
formulas shown in (5), (6), and (11). By using the Baum-Welch algorithm, HMM makes it 
possible to determine the model which will produce a given sequence of observations with the 
highest probability. It takes the sequence of observations and allocates observations to 
particular states based on the current values of aji and bi(k). 
                                                              
i
i T f p ) (                                                      (11) 
The state transition of the process assumes it to be classified in models depending on what 
the process executes and the external conditions of the process in the system environment. 
Therefore, to improve the precision of detecting the anomaly state, we need to prepare 
multiple HMM for each classified model. Based on this, we arrange multiple HMM to learn 
each model. If the emissions are generated by HMM, we compare the symbols with the 
previously learned HMM. 
 
3.3.3. Training and Detection 
 
We use precision p as the calculation result of an HMM to judge the anomaly. p is the sum 
of the probabilities of matching each model that is shown in formula (11). The system 
calculates the p at the condition of  T
t t V 0 ) (   by using aji and symbol emission probability bi(k) 
which are learned within the training. We set a certain probability as a threshold  . In the 
training phase, if the precision p is higher than a threshold , we decide that the input data 
and learned model are matched ( p   ). We add the matched data to the compared model as 
training data. In contrast, if the values are not matched or there are no models to be matched, 
we create a new model and add the unmatched data to the new model as training data in the 
same way as in the learning process. The normal models are stored before the system starts to 
provide the actual services. After actual service is started, the system stores the resource 
usage data in particular sampling periods, and calculates vectors in the same way as in the 
learning process. Then, it makes clusters which are adjusted in the learning phase. Those data 
are eventually used to evaluate the learned model. In the operation phase, if the precision  pis 
higher than the threshold   ( p   ), we decide the incoming data is normal. But if it is not 
( p   ), we decide it’s an anomaly.  
 
4. Implementation 
 
4.1. Overall architecture 
 International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
Vol. 3, No. 3, July, 2009 
 
 
44 
Our prototype system is developed as a kernel module on the Linux kernel 2.6.23. In 
Figure 1 the overall architecture of Ayaka is shown. Ayaka will start with some parameters 
that the administrator or system designer set. The parameters are the process IDs which need 
to be watched, the monitoring period, and the policy actuated when anomalies are detected. 
Ayaka is composed of the following three main functions. 
 
  Tracing: In Ayaka, kernel hooks are inserted to take a log of the accurate amount of 
resources that a process uses. Each hook traces and accumulates the amount of the 
resources such as CPU, memory, network resources that a process uses. The detailed 
hook points are described in section 4.2. To take the information from the each hook 
point, we use the extension of LTTng (LTT Next Generation) [10]. It provides the basic 
tracing facilities, such as a trace point call back mechanism, to take information from 
each hook in the Linux kernel. 
  Accounting: The accounting section provides the facilities for managing the resource 
usage of each process or group of processes. To manage the resource consumption of 
processes, it provides timers and monitoring objects. If a process uses a resource such as  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Overall Architecture 
 
 
 
memory or a network socket, the tracing callback facilities store the information, 
including the amount of resources the process uses, for the monitored object. The 
dynamic timer manages the periodic time. When the user passes the sampling period T 
for Ayaka’s API, the API sets the period into the monitoring object, and the monitoring 
object collects the resource information of the monitored process periodically. When it 
reaches the next period, after calculating the utilization of the resources for each process, 
these statistics are stored in a ring-buffer in kernel memory that is exposed to users 
through /proc file systems. These accounting facilities are implemented as an extension 
of the Accounting System [28]. It also provides the process control functions to avoid 
suffering damage to resources through abuse of the process. 
 
  Analysis: We implement a monitoring daemon that reads the data from the /proc file 
system and passes it to the analysis module, which analyzes the data. Currently, we have 
implemented the HMM algorithm that we described in the previous section. In learning 
mode, it works to learn the data to build the normal model of the process resource usage. 
In detection mode, by using the normal model, it can find anomalies compared with the International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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trained models. At the time of detecting an anomaly, the module will report it to the 
accounting facilities which control the process. A process control mechanism blocks the 
process in a mandatory way. Generally, the module is replaceable, since a variety of 
methods is used according to the threat. These procedures are performed online, but it is 
also possible to create files from the kernel buffer that can be used for off-line analysis. 
 
4.2. Collecting the Resource Data 
 
In this section, we describe the method used for collecting the data of a process in detail. 
Our tracer provides the facilities to collect the resource event and a fine-grained timestamp 
for the time of occurrence of the event with a timestamp counter. To collect the data for CPU, 
memory, and network resources, we set hooks in the following places. 
 
  CPU: We set the hooks at the point of the context switch in the scheduler in order to 
obtain the execution time of each process accurately. Ayaka accumulates the execution 
time of the process for the monitoring object that the process belongs to. 
 
  Memory: We set the hooks at the point of adding PTE (Page Table Entry) and removing 
a page from a file page to obtain the memory consumed by each process. The same as 
the CPU, Ayaka accumulates the pages which a process uses in its execution. 
 
Table 3. Creates Ayaka API 
 
API Contents 
create  Creates and initializes a new monitoring object. A sampling period is needed for it. 
bind  Makes a relationship to the monitoring object and a process which is monitored. 
unbind  Releases the process which is monitored from the host monitoring object. 
destroy  Destroys the memory area used by monitoring object. 
set  Makes modifications to the parameter of the monitoring object 
get  Obtains parameters from a specified monitoring object. 
 
 
  Network : We set the hooks at the point where a network socket buffer held and released 
to count the socket buffers used for the task. These hooks are available for the tracers 
which are loaded as a group of hooks and facilities. In our system, if a developer wants 
to add a new hook, it can be added by registering the hook and the callback function in it. 
 
These hooks are available for the tracers which are loaded as a group of hooks and facilities. 
In our system, if a developer wants to add a new hook, it can be added by registering the hook 
and the callback function in it. The overhead of our tracer is less than 2.5% of the generally 
system overhead, however, we only use a few of the hooks that are provided by LTTng. 
Therefore, this reduces the general overhead of our tracer and makes monitoring as light-
weight as possible. 
 
4.3. User APIs 
 
Ayaka proposed APIs for collecting resource data in a ring-buffer in the kernel and setting 
the sampling period T for each process or group of processes. Ayaka’s APIs are described in 
Table 3. The procedures required to use our system are as follows. The developer first calls 
create for creating the monitoring group, which is a unit of the resource monitoring feature 
with the parameter of the sampling period and a certain enforcement policy. As the second 
step, the process ID is set to call bind to register the process ID for the monitoring group. At 
the time of a process bind to a monitoring group, the process or processes are under the International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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control of the Ayaka monitoring system. These APIs have symmetrical APIs, such as destroy 
and unbind. The set and get APIs are provided for changing the parameters of the monitoring 
group and taking the information from the monitoring group. Our system provides a 
pluggable, modularized interface for the analysis of resource data. It is possible to replace the 
analysis method. For example, in this paper we use HMM for data analysis, but it could be 
easily replaced by another method without changing the core system. 
 
4.4. Enforcement Policies 
 
Ayaka not only provides the analysis modules that detect the anomaly, but provides the 
enforcement functions that can control the problematic process before serious problems and 
critical damage arise in the system: Report the anomaly to a higher node: sends a signal to a 
registered process or a registered host immediately when an anomaly is detected. Block the 
suspicious process: blocks the process that is responsible for the anomaly in order to prevent 
further damage. Dump process data to another host: sends a process dump of the observed 
process that caused the anomaly for later analysis. These enforcement functions are available 
to write a policy for system calls. Ayaka provides APIs to set up the policy for the functions. 
 
5. Experiments & Evaluation 
 
Our prototype implementation of Ayaka is based on Linux kernel modifications and 
augmentations. In this section, we evaluate the overhead and precision of the system. The 
hardware environment is an Intel(R) Pentium(R) D 2.80GHz CPU system with 2GB of 
memory. 
 
5.1. Basic System Overhead 
 
To evaluate the basic overhead of Ayaka, we ran a simple calculation program on the 
monitoring system and measured the execution time with the CPU cycle counter (TSC 
counter in x86). We compare three environments. Table 4 shows the results of 1,000 
executions of the program in different environments. In this table, Without Monitoring means 
that Ayaka is turned off. Training indicates the learning phase where Ayaka collects the data 
and stores the models of the normal behavior of a process. Runtime indicates that the system 
is working both training and detecting concurrently. 
In this table, we can see the overhead percentage for each environment in (B). Compared to 
Without Monitoring, Training increases the overhead up to 1.1% and the Runtime overhead 
up to 1.2%. These results show the overhead of Ayaka is small enough to use the system 
successfully. 
 
Table 4. System Overhead 
 
Execution Time (second)  Without Monitoring  Training  Runtime 
Average Execution Time  1.902  1.923  1.925 
Max 1.950  1.978  1.970 
Min 1.899  1.922  1.922 
(A) Ratio to Without Monitoring  1.000  1.011  1.012 
(B) Overhead {(A) – 1}%  -  1.10%  1.20% 
 
5.2. Response Time Overhead 
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Ayaka not only provides the analysis modules that detect the anomaly, but provides the 
enforcement functions that can control the problematic process before serious problems and 
critical damage arise in the system: Report the anomaly to a higher node: sends a signal to a 
registered process or a registered host immediately when an anomaly is detected. Block the 
suspicious process: blocks the process that is responsible for the anomaly in order to prevent 
further damage. Dump process data to another host: sends a process dump of the observed 
process that caused the anomaly for later analysis. These enforcement functions are available 
to write a policy for system calls. Ayaka provides APIs to set up the policy for the functions. 
 
Table 5. Response Time and Sampling Rate 
 
Sampling Period (milisec)  Ave  Max  Min 
1 0.337  0.338  0.331 
10 0.150  0.533  0.146 
100 0.127  0.139  0.125 
1,000 0.129  0.436  0.124 
10,000 0.127  0.417  0.123 
Without Monitoring  0.126  0.335  0.124 
 
5.3. Precision of Detection 
 
5.3.1. Target Environment 
 
To verify the effectiveness of our methodology, we evaluated the detection accuracy by 
comparing it with other methodologies. We chose two cases for illustration, SQL injection 
and buffer overrun. Buffer overrun is one of the most popular hacking attacks and a common 
cause of malfunctioning software. If the amount of data written into a buffer exceeds the size 
of the buffer, the additional data will be written into adjacent areas. We developed a 
vulnerable echo server which had a rather small buffer. When we overran the buffer by 
sending it large amounts of data, the echo server went into an infinite loop. We evaluated our 
system by detecting this anomaly attack by analyzing resource usage of the echo server 
process. SQL injection is a technique that exploits the security vulnerability of a PHP script 
that occurs in the database layer of an application. In our setup, we deployed a vulnerable 
PHP script and read large volumes of data from the database that should not be accessible, by 
injecting SQL queries. The vulnerable PHP core was ” SELECT * FROM table WHERE 
name = ’ ’ ” that can easily pass extended commands such as ’ OR ’1’= ’1’ as a true case for 
reading all of the database information. We evaluated our system by detecting this anomaly in 
the resource usage of the Apache (server) process. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Test Environment with Fault Injections International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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5.3.2. Comparison 
 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we compared our Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) with popular methods such as the Threshold, the Moving Average, and the Rate of 
Change methods. The threshold method observes CPU usage to determine whether it exceeds 
a certain threshold. The moving average method sets a sampling period to calculate the 
average of resource usage dynamically. It also compares the result to a certain threshold value. 
Rate of Change observes whether the increase in the rate of CPU usage exceeds a threshold. 
We evaluated each method and selected the best threshold for each by comparing multiple 
threshold values. A is used for the best threshold value to detect the SQL injection, and B for 
buffer overrun. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Method and Best Suited Threshold 
  Threshold 
Method  (A) SQL Injection  (B) Buffer Overrun 
Threshold  0.15 0.35 
Moving Average  0.09 0.15 
Rate of Change  300.00 5.00 
 
 
Table 7. Method and Best Suited Threshold 
  SQL Injection  Buffer Overrun 
Method  Fn Fp  Total  Fn Fp  Total 
HMM  0  6 6 0 2 2 
Threshold  A  4  3 7 0 5 5 
Threshold  B  20  0  20 1 0 1 
Moving  Average  A  3  3 6 0 5 5 
Moving Average B  20  0  20  0  0  0 
Rate of Change A  0 957 957 0 27 27 
Rate of Change B  0  972  972  0  27  27 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Detection 
Accuracy in SQL Injection 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Detection 
Accuracy in Buffer Overrun 
 
5.3.3. Experiments with precision 
 
We compared the detection capabilities of each method by using the threshold parameters. 
We used a system that has learned normal patterns, then we used this experimental 
environment for evaluation.  
In the case of SQL injection, we developed a client application that issues SQL queries 
against the database of the server application. The client accesses the server 1,000 times 
within 100 minutes. We set up the client to issue attacks 20 times within the above accesses. International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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This means 2% of the data contains an anomaly pattern. The evaluation criteria are to detect 
anomalies within three seconds after the server has sent the last message as a response from 
the client that sent the attack. In the case of buffer overrun, we also developed a client 
application that uses an exploitation of the vulnerability. The client sends 50 normal messages, 
then sends an attack message. If Ayaka detects the anomaly within three seconds after the 
client issues the attack access, it was judged as a success. We evaluate the above case twice. 
In both cases, we judged a false negative if they could not detect the anomaly within the time 
limit, and a false positive if they detect the anomaly before or after the limit. We also judge a 
false positive if they detect a normal access as an anomaly. 
The results expressed in the number of false negatives (Fn) and false positives (Fp) are 
shown in Table 7 and Figures 3 and 4. For SQL injection, the HMM, Rate of Change A and 
Rate of Change B methods show that the number of false negatives are zero (minimum). Even 
though the minimum number is shown for Rate of Change A and Rate of Change B, the 
numbers of false positives are 957 and 972. So their total number is same as the false positive. 
The number of false positives is zero in Threshold B and Moving Average A, B, however, the 
number of false negatives is 20. This means they have not detected any anomaly in the past. 
Compared to the total number in the evaluation, both HMM and Moving Average A scores 
are the minimum, 6. But, when thinking about the detection rate, a false negative of 0 is more 
important than a false positive of 0, because it means HMM can detect all anomalies. 
 
5.3.4. Precision and Sampling Period 
 
In this section, we evaluate the essential factor that influences the accuracy of anomaly 
detection. We chose the two parameters, precision p and sampling period. We mentioned in 
section 3 that the precision p has an effect on the accuracy of detection, which is the sum of 
the probabilities that match the HMM and input data. We consider that the sampling period T 
also has some effect on the accuracy of detection. We evaluated differences in detection 
accuracy for these parameters. We took the same procedure as that explained in 5.3. The 
thresholds are used in both the learning time and detection time, as we described in section 
3.3. We set the matrix in which {10
-1, 10
-2, 10
-3} is used to set a different pattern. The results  
 
Table 8. Detection Accuracy with Different Thresholds 
 
Threshold (Learning)  Threshold(Detection) Fn  Fp 
10
-1 10
-1 0  635 
 10
-3 0  10 
 10
-5 0  6 
10
-2 10
-1 0  170 
 10
-3 0  13 
 10
-5 0  13 
10
-3 10
-1 0  51 
 10
-3 0  15 
 10
-5 0  15 
 
Table 9. Detection Accuracy with Different Sampling Periods 
 
Sampling Period (milisec)  Fn  Fp 
10 0  955 
100 0  0 
1,000 0  6 
10,000 2  70 International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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are shown in Table 8. In the results, every combination can detect the anomaly, and lower 
threshold values show fewer false positives. False positives are lower, especially when the 
learning threshold is high and the detection threshold is below 10
-3. 
Next, we evaluated the differences of the sampling period and the accuracy of anomaly 
detection. The results are shown in Table 9. A sampling period of 100ms is the best because 
false negatives and false positives are zero. For longer periods above 100ms, the number of 
false negatives and false positives is worse. In contrast, shorter periods (10ms) clearly 
increase the number of false positives. Considering Table 5, a period of 100ms can achieve 
the best results with respect to overhead and accuracy of detection. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
For our approach, there are two important points to discuss. First of all, our approach uses 
resource usage (CPU, memory, and network resources) of specific processes to create models 
with a self-learning approach. In contrast to the existing approaches which use function calls 
and system calls as information to create the models to detect anomalies, our approach is 
more general and independent from both language and operating systems. The differences are 
not so small when we consider developing new embedded system products that are 
constructed with a variety of hardware and software. For these products, our approach brings 
benefits to reduce the development time. Actually, there are tradeoffs between accuracy and 
generality. System calls and function calls have a dependency on their application and 
operating system, but at the same time, they can provide more specific hints to detect the 
cause of the anomaly [16]. Moreover, the function calls provide more accurate hints than 
system calls because of their program dependencies. But, in addition to the accurate results, 
they provide the larger overheads than the system calls [20]. We think that detecting the cause 
of the problem accurately with a self-learning method is still not easy, because we could not 
create all of the anomaly models. We assume that it is better to find an anomaly earlier and in 
a general way, and it is more practical to analyze the cause manually soon after finding the 
anomalies. This is the discussion point behind building a practical system. As our next step, 
we will consider a co-operative system that can offer a log as a complement for our system. 
The second discussion point is that we need to find the elemental hints for detecting 
anomalies in our system rather than with the resource data. There are lots of hints to detect 
anomalies to increase our detection rate. For example, we assume a higher threshold  is 
favorable in the learning phase rather than in the operating phase, because it will generate a 
new model with less probability than the lower threshold. On the contrary, if we set a higher 
threshold   in the runtime analysis phase, the judgment is more severe when judging it to be 
normal. We try to find the appropriate threshold evaluation. The results show that our 
assumption is approximately right on reducing the false positives. It means that our approach 
still has room to increase the preciseness of detecting anomalies by detecting the relevant 
parameters. We must try to discover these parameters to increase the detection rate. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Anomaly detection for future information appliances is a big concern in the area of 
embedded systems. In this paper, we firstly described the system requirements of current 
information appliances that are needed for lightweight online monitoring system, and based 
on their requirements, proposed Ayaka. It is a light-weight anomaly detection system based 
on resource monitoring of CPU, memory and network usage, independent of programming 
language and platform. To improve detection accuracy, we use statistical techniques that treat International Journal of Security and Its Applications 
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the data. Our main contribution is to present methodologies to find unknown anomalies 
without a preexisting strict model of anomalies. We adapt the machine learning technique to 
study a domain specific model in order to detect anomalies without domain specific 
knowledge of the system. In our evaluation, the system overhead is about 1.1-1.2%. And for 
SQL injection, our system presented the minimum number of false negatives and false 
positives compared to other methods. However, in buffer overrun problem settings, the 
moving average approach is better than our methodology. This means that the accuracy of 
detecting anomalies depends on the behavior of the problem. We also find that accuracy was 
influenced by sampling parameters and thresholds of precision in HMM, within the learning 
and runtime analysis phases. In the future, we will try to improve our method to detect 
anomalies more precisely. 
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